

UNFCCC Copenhagen Negotiation: Way Forward or Back Track

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1. Summary

One of the most important rounds of United Nations climate negotiations concluded in Bangkok on 09 October 2009 starting from 28 September 2009. This two weeks climate talks ended with mixed results, while progress on the major issues of Bali Road Map have remained largely impasses with developed and developing nations disagreeing on how to share the burden of slashing heat-trapping greenhouse gases and how to pay for it.

Attended by some 4,000 people, the Bangkok talks were aimed at hammering out a global climate deal to limit greenhouse gas emissions when the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period expires at the end of 2012. The deadline comes in December at the annual UN climate conference in Copenhagen where a deal is supposed to be sealed. The new deal is to tackle the causes of climate change (mitigation) and to assist countries to cope with the impacts of climate change that we can no longer avoid (adaptation).

As per science's prediction, the developing world has called on industrialised countries to commit to 40 or 45 percent cuts in emissions by 2020, compared to the 1990 benchmark. But, in all the way of Bangkok Climate Talks the developed country Parties were found pushing obligatory emission reduction actions by the Parties of advanced developing economies-saying that the emission reduction pledge of the developed countries is premised on an effective and fair agreement with the participation of the advanced developing countries. The developed country Parties also asked for shared responsibilities of the developing country Parties in mobilizing adaptation finance. These are just talking 'out of the box' as the Kyoto Protocol, the only international treaty on curbing the output of greenhouse gases, requires the 37 industrialized countries to reduce their carbon emission by a certain amount, measured against a 1990 benchmark. Therefore, asking the developing country parties to follow the trait of the developed countries in tackling the climate change is bypassing of the 'equity principle' of the UNFCCC and denial of the historical responsibility by the developed country parties to take lead in mitigating climate crisis. Moreover, the present pledge of emission reduction, totaling 11-18 percent below 1990 level by 2020, is far below from the 'political will' of the developed country parties.

The most disappointing part of Bangkok talks was the 'back track' approach of the developed nations from the Kyoto Protocol and unfolding the important provisions of the Kyoto to a new one. Developing countries in one strong unequivocal voice oppose moves by developed countries to abandon the Kyoto Protocol that has legally binding greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. In a quick reaction G77 and China expressed their grave concern on the 'killing attempt' of the Kyoto Protocol by the developed countries and have said 'Kyoto must be renewed and strengthened'.

Although the executive secretary of the UNFCCC, Yvo de Boer, termed this two weeks talks "constructive" saying that "all the ingredients for a successful outcome in Copenhagen are on the table", but the European Commission President Jose Barroso expressed worries by the progress of the negotiations in Bangkok and its prospects in Copenhagen and said that, 'we are dangerously close to

deadlock'. The EU President expressed such worries before an audience of editors from around the world who met Copenhagen in the recently concluded 'Editors Forum on Climate Change'.

Meantime many, both from developed and developing countries, started arguing -what would happen to all the good things under Kyoto if it were not to continue? A new international agreement is urgently needed to address climate change and it must include emission robust and ambitious reduction commitment by developed countries, nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing countries, financial assistance to developing countries for adaptation and mitigation actions, and technology cooperation as outlined in Bali Action Plan; and Kyoto has all these.

We urge the governments of world's leading economies to materialize two degrees Celsius goal that they agreed both in the G8 and the Major Economies Forum. All should maximize the opportunities Copenhagen offers for a strong and coherent climate deal to "recalibrate" the international response to climate change in line with the danger posed to human security and development.

2. Climate Change Negotiation: LDCs are in Crossfire between Developed and Developing Country Parties

Discussions in Copenhagen, at the 15th Conference of Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC, will mostly center on the formulation of a new statement of commitment that will replace the Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012. This will then form the basis for future commitments of all State Parties. The new commitments will have implications for both Annex 1 (Industrialized Countries) and Non-Annex (Developing and Least Developed) Countries, but countries are found negotiating divided in several major blocs.

In the 13th Conference of the Parties (CoP 13) held in Bali in 2007, so as in the Bangkok Climate Talks, the country parties were found negotiating through three major blocks i) the European Union, ii) the United States, supported by Japan and Canada and, iii) the G77 and China. Besides, there are other regional blocs also like; African Group; LDC Group; The Alliance of Small Island Developing States-AOSIS; Environmental Integrity Group; Umbrella Group etc.

Among the negotiating blocs, the G 77 and China is the major one, comprises with 132 countries, which includes developing, LDCs, and the small island countries. The G 77 and China is the platform of almost all the Non Annex Country Parties who are historically not responsible for the present climate crisis. Therefore, in broader sense, G 77 and China is a distinctive negotiating bloc of common interest. But given the context of disparity in economic comparability, GDP growth of the country Parties 'G77 and China' is a heterogeneous Group mostly driven by the interests of the advanced developing countries.

The Bangkok Climate Talks evidently proved that the industrialized countries are not ready to compromise their consumerism and development pace for the sake of global interest. Both the developed and advanced developing nations were trying to keep ways open for carbon emission; although the consequences of delay in the process of reducing emission will result more climatic catastrophes and social imbalances and massive economic collapse in the least developed countries like Bangladesh.

3. Bangkok Climate Talks: the Major Agenda of Discussion

The Bangkok Climate Talks hold the first part of the seventh session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (AWG-LCA 7) and the first part of the ninth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 9). The work in Bangkok under the AWG-LCA 7 focused on the key elements of the Bali Action Plan (BAP) namely: adaptation, finance, technology, mitigation, capacity building and a shared vision for long-term cooperative action. The Bangkok talks also focused on 'the Bali Roadmap, an agreement on a two-year process, which covers negotiation "tracks" under the Convention and the Protocol and sets a deadline for concluding the

negotiations at COP 15 and COP/ MOP 5, to be held in Copenhagen in December 2009. Thus, the two key bodies under the Bali Roadmap are the AWG-LCA and the AWG-KP.

As a result of two weeks of negotiations, the AWG-LCA produced a number of non papers that will be forwarded to the resumed AWG-LCA 7 in Barcelona.

On the other hand, discussion under AWG-KP 9 rounded on Annex I parties' emission reductions beyond the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, parties continued to discuss other issues in the AWG-KP's work programme, including the flexibility mechanisms, DEDD and REDD Plus, land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) as well as potential consequences of response measures.

4. Discussion on AWG-LCA 7: Talking Outside the Box

“Advanced developing countries” should take on quantified emission reductions, (something that was not agreed on nor even asked of them at Bali.).....The US delegation chief, Jonathan Pershing

The agenda item on ‘AGW-LCA 7’ covers the key elements of the Bali Action Plan (BAP), namely: a shared vision for long-term cooperative action, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology and capacity building. On mitigation, the BAP contains six sub-paragraphs: of which discussion on 1(b)(i) and 1(b)(ii) created ‘deep divides’ between developed and developing country Parties.

At the group's first meeting on 28 September, the US, supported by Australia, Japan, the EU, Norway, Colombia and Costa Rica, proposed creation of a separate sub-group to consider proposals relating to common elements of mitigation by all parties. India and several other developing countries opposed, stressing that such proposals are inconsistent with the Convention as they would impose new requirements on developing countries.

The US explained its country vision, saying that it is different from the Protocol and builds on the Convention's commitments and obligations that are common for all parties. The US proposal outlined a framework on monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) for all parties, which builds on the existing frameworks, and would introduce enhanced reporting, as well as a technical review by experts. The EU also called for a ‘collective effort’ from all to create low carbon development strategies. The EU stressed the need to carry over the “key Kyoto elements” for developed countries, including:

economy-wide and binding quantified emission limitation or reduction objectives (QELROs); robust reporting and accounting consistent with Protocol Articles 5, 7 and 8; the flexibility mechanisms; and notions of compliance. Also highlighted the need for an architecture that enables developing country nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) to go forward, and expressed interest in exploring the idea of national schedules. Australia elaborated its country proposal on national schedules of mitigation

Sub-paragraphs on Mitigation

- 1(b)(i) on mitigation by developed countries: For the developed countries the text says; Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all developed country Parties, while ensuring the comparability of efforts among them, taking into account differences in their national circumstances.
- 1(b)(ii) on mitigation by developing countries; Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.
- 1(b)(iii) on reducing deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, plus conservation (REDD-plus);
- 1(b)(iv) on sectoral approaches;
- 1(b)(v) on various approaches to enhance the cost effectiveness of mitigation action, including markets; and
- 1(b)(vi) on consequences of response measures.

commitments or actions, noting that the proposal accounts different circumstances and capabilities of parties, and enables transparency and enhanced action over time. This proposal also focuses development of ‘economy-wide’ targets by the developed countries and synergies between low-carbon strategies and registers.

During the overarching contact group on mitigation convened from 1-9 October several Umbrella Group countries proposed insertion of principles and frameworks for mitigation actions by all parties at the beginning of the mitigation section of the BAP.

The developed countries seem to be engaging in a concerted plan to reduce their own commitments while pushing their burden onto developing countries, which are asked to take on more than their fair share. Therefore, the proposals on frameworks for mitigation action by all parties is conflicting with the Convention and the BAP, as they seek to erase the distinction between developed and developing countries and impose new mitigation and reporting commitments on the latter. G-77/China, reasonably, opposed insertion of new sub-paragraph in the mitigation text of BAP saying that this will disregard the distinction between mitigation by developed and developing countries both in magnitude and legal nature.

5. Killing Kyoto: Revival of Bush’s Strategy

“The KP track is about to be destroyed and its debris and fragmented pieces lie on the Convention track. The train to Copenhagen is in peril. Don’t kill the KP and don’t derail our Copenhagen train.”
.....Ambassador Yu Qingtai, China’s special envoy for climate,

The agenda item of Ad hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) is tasked negotiating the enhancement of actions to ensure full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention. And the AWG-KP is tasked with setting the reduction targets for the post-2012 commitment period at a time when scientific evidence demands deep cuts in the range of at least 25-40% by 2020.

However it is clear by the close of the Bangkok session that almost all the developed countries including Japan, Australia and the European Union want to dismantle the Kyoto Protocol, collapse the two tracks into one and produce one single legal outcome in the December UN climate conference in Copenhagen. If we see, what actually Kyoto meant? What are the basic features of Kyoto? It’s the Kyoto Protocol that outlined an integrated approach of facing the challenges of climate change. It sets quantitative emission reduction targets, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, approaches, and efforts, as well as preferential treatment on the basis of the common but differentiated responsibilities. The Protocol also highlighted the importance of adaptation measures, capacity building, support to the capacity building, innovation of green technologies and technology transfer to the vulnerable countries to adapt to the climate change impacts and to initiate low-carbon development path, which is ideally a new element in the developmental policy.

Kyoto protocol not a ‘protocol’ in literary term, it has created a global coalition between politicians and experts and bureaucrats and civil society organizations and people across boundaries. Kyoto has created ‘options’ for the country Parties to revert the Earth atmosphere to a habitable one.

The Kyoto basics

In December 1997, delegates at COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan, agreed to a Protocol to the UNFCCC that commits industrialized countries and countries in transition to a market economy to achieve emission reduction targets. These countries, known under the UNFCCC as Annex I parties, agreed to reduce their overall emissions of six greenhouse gases by an average of 5.2% below 1990 levels between 2008-2012 (the first commitment period), with specific targets varying from country to country. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005 and now has 189 parties. The Protocol provides for commitment periods that set legally binding aggregate and individual targets for Annex I Parties to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and has a compliance system.

Up to now, Kyoto succeeded to create dialogue among people with different insights and different interests and it created a common aim to succeed. All the country Parties, except US, have endorsed the Kyoto and all the country Parties regard the agreement they made under Kyoto on mitigation and adaptation measures. Kyoto is an integrated, equitable and efficient, both in terms of market-orientation and in terms of the possibility to foster technological innovation. It is binding but at the same time it is flexible; Kyoto has been made unique through subsequent Conferences of the Parties laid out very detailed terms in order to arrive at a legal text without any loopholes so that it could function as a basis of joint international policymaking.

But, ironically, the implementation of Kyoto Protocol initially faced the challenges from the developed countries, as they were not ready to compromise with their economic growth. In this context, the Kyoto Protocol gave flexibility to the Annex I country parties in fulfilling their mitigation targets across borders.

Now, the approach of killing Kyoto or picking the preferable options, what was told as ‘cherry picking’, by the developed countries remind us the criticism of the former US president, George W Bush, who once said that ‘Kyoto is dead’. At that time there was ‘unified global atmosphere’ to denounce the statement made by George Bush, now at this very moment the world also require a joint atmosphere to keep Kyoto Protocol functioning towards its end and with unified force and commitment of all county Parties.

6. Mitigation Commitment by the Annex I Parties: robust, ambitious; but little progress in quantifying ambitious mitigation target.

"It will be extraordinarily difficult for the U.S. to commit to a specific number in the absence of action from Congress," State Department deputy climate envoy Jonathan Pershing

In Bangkok negotiation all the country Parties, especially the developed nations, were speaking for ‘robust’ and ‘ambitious’ emission reduction although the qualifying criteria of these words still remain in vague. The negotiation was overwhelmed by each topic with masses of technical detail and there was little outcome in the negotiation of deep and ambitious Annex I Party quantified emission reduction targets for the second commitment period and using of objective criteria.

On mitigation commitments or actions by the Annex I country Parties, the EU, supported by Norway, highlighted the level of ambition as the core of the discussions. The US called for focusing on operational language rather than on expectations. Australia supported stabilization at 450 ppm or less, while the Federated States of Micronesia preferred stabilization at as far below 350 ppm as possible, this has been supported by AOSIS and a number of vulnerable countries. Norway outlined plans to reduce emissions by 40% below 1990 levels by 2020.

These pledges do not reflect the sprit of ‘ambitious’ and ‘robust’ mitigation commitments or actions of the country Parties. A 11 to 18 percent reduction of global emissions below 1990 levels by 2020 would be the result if the pledges made by Australia, Belarus, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia and Ukraine are totaled. This is less than the 25 to 40 percent range of emission reductions that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change advises would be necessary for stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide at 450 parts per million. Even the 450 ppm level of carbon dioxide is associated with a 52 percent risk of overshooting the goal of limiting the average global temperature rise to two degrees Celsius over pre-industrial levels.

AOSIS emphasized the group’s deep disappointment with the emission reduction commitment presented so far, and said this would lead to a temperature increase of “3°C or worse.” CHINA recalled the history of the UNFCCC process, indicating that as soon as an instrument has been adopted, “efforts get underway to undermine it” and Annex I countries attempt to move away from their historical responsibility. GUYANA, CHINA, PAKISTAN, OMAN and GABON noted that the level of Annex I aggregate emission reductions currently on the table does not reach the level of ambition needed, and called on

Annex I countries to increase their pledges. The EU, with NORWAY, underscored that they wished to see a collective ambition to reduce emissions by 30% below 1990 levels by 2020. The total of commitments made by developed countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions falls short of stabilizing global temperatures at a level that will avert dangerous climate change.

In all the way of Bangkok Climate Talks the developed country Parties including EU, Australia, Japan were found pushing emission reduction by the MAJOR EMMITTERS; which includes the Parties of advanced developing economies like China, India, Brazil. Japan specifically emphasized that their pledge of reducing emissions by 25% from 1990 levels by 2020 is premised on an effective and fair agreements with the participation of the MAJOR EMMITTERS. In contrary to this, China-India-Kuwait emphasized that the words like 'Advanced Developing Countries', 'Major Emitters' are mentioned nowhere in the Convention and Protocol; therefore the discussion should be based on 'Historical Responsibility' and the principle of 'Common but Differentiated Responsibilities'.

Though, progress is being made in the negotiations on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) and REDD Plus (which also includes conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks) but the developing nations wanted to limit emission reduction using market mechanism. The Federated States of Micronesia, for AOSIS, and COSTA RICA stressed that the developed countries should achieve their QELROs primarily through domestic emission reduction. G77 and China express worries that the use of offsetting mechanisms i.e. CDM and REDD in achieving QELROs will weaken emission reduction commitments. In support to the statement made by China, BRAZIL, with COLOMBIA, asked to introduce defining limits to the use of market mechanisms. BOLIVIA highlighted a recent proposal by her country that developed countries should achieve their QELROs domestically and not through market mechanisms. There also heated debate on comparability of efforts, mitigation commitments or actions, and achievement of QELROs by the developed country Parties (Quantified Emission Reduction Objectives).

In relation to emission reduction the Convention provides a strong foundation for an inclusive, fair and effective international climate change regime which effectively addresses the imperative to stabilize the climate system while recognizing imperative and right of developing countries to develop, address poverty and food security. In this context the Convention is based on the principle of equity where developed countries, who are most responsible for the problem need to “take the lead”, as well as the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities where all countries would act in accordance with their responsibilities. The article 3 of the convention (referred to as equity article) stipulates that; a) Parties should protect the climate system ‘on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and b) Developed countries should take the lead in combating and the adverse effect thereof. Thus, the intention of the developed countries to bring developing countries under ‘binding commitment’ on emission reduction and MRVs on the ongoing negotiation is conflicting to the Kyoto Protocol and also to the Equity Principle of the UNFCCC.

The present pledge of emission reduction is far below from the ‘political will’ of the developed country parties. In July, both the G8 and the Major Economies Forum, representing the world's 17 leading economies, agreed for the first time to the two degrees Celsius goal. A will has emerged in world’s political arena to build the architecture to rapidly implement climate action but the negotiators "are still hanging on to long-held differences. We only have 1 week to meet in Barcelona; it’s an urgency of raising ambitions and "bridging the disconnect" so that the country Parties could work-out a consolidated and unified text for Copenhagen.

7. Adaptation: major concern of the LDCs, SIDS and Developing Countries

The goal of the international convention on climate change is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with

the climate system. There are three major strategies of achieving this goal, like; a) mitigation b) measures to adaptation – the process whereby individuals, communities, corporate and public bodies prepare for and manage the adverse effects of a changing climate and new extremes in weather events and c) realization sustainable development – ensuring the equitable development needs and rights of present and future generations.

On implementation of adaptation actions, South Africa highlighted a proposal for an international programme on implementation of adaptation activities, stressing that it is not a “random” collection of things that could be done, but “a coherent and systematic programme” to address the short-, medium- and long-term impacts of climate change. The G-77/China emphasized that adaptation actions in developing countries must be supported by developed countries in accordance with their obligations under the Convention. The LDCs expressed concern that reference to integration of adaptation into development could lead to “too much integration” and detract from the value of stand-alone action. AOSIS, with Bhutan, noted that the objective should be to address the urgent and immediate needs of developing countries, especially SIDS, LDCs and African countries, and called for mechanisms for addressing loss and damage to be captured as part of the scope. The African Group noted the need for consistency on the definition of vulnerable developing countries throughout the text. China cautioned against establishing vulnerability criteria based on national circumstances, respective financial and technical capabilities, levels of risk and impacts, as well as levels of poverty. The EU underscored that the focus should be on the most vulnerable developing countries and opposed references to impacts of response measures and historical emissions. Saudi Arabia called for retaining language on impacts of response measures.

South Africa said the objectives should reflect, the need to reduce vulnerability and build resilience, as well as identify linkages and coherence with actions taking place at the international level. The US and Norway highlighted integrating adaptation into national planning and policies as a critical element. Norway highlighted subsidiarity as key to adaptation processes, where adaptation actions are based on, and respond to, needs at the lowest and local levels.

On risk reduction, AOSIS noted that risk reduction and management should: have a special window in the financial mechanism; address both extreme and slow onset events; and include both risk reduction and insurance components. The G-77/China called for inclusion of migration, displacement, and planned relocation. Colombia said that 30% of adaptation funding should be dedicated to disaster reduction and preparedness.

8. Adaptation Finance: beginning of a constructive discussion for Copenhagen

"At the end of the day, if you don't have ambitious (emissions reductions) targets from rich nations, and if you don't have significant finance on the table, the whole thing falls apart," Yvo de Boer,

Although the three strategies of addressing climate change e.g mitigation, adaptation and support to existing development growth are interlinked but the later two are specifically important and real challenge to the developing countries which would require new, addition and incremental financial resources for implementation. In this regards, the Bali Action Plan refers to the need of “improved access to *adequate, predictable* and sustainable financial resources ... and noted a provision of *new and additional* resources” and “*innovative means of funding* to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change in meeting the cost of adaptation”.

The developing country demand for ‘new and additional’ funds from developed countries, as well as for their ‘adequacy’ and ‘predictability’ which are by no means new. It has also been articulated in Article 4.3 of the UNFCCC. Given the patterns of differentiated (historic) responsibilities, the costs for developing country adaptation are seen as debts to be borne by the still largely responsible industrialized world, and debts cannot be repaid by loans, or even by ‘grants’ – this notion is beyond the so called donor and

recipient tradition. Moreover, given this pattern of differentiated responsibilities, there are also very strongly held views on the importance of an *equitable* distribution of the burden of such funding.

In Bangkok Climate Talks the developed country Parties, dryly, asked for shared responsibilities of the developing country Parties in mobilizing adaptation finance. MEXICAN proposal of “Global Climate Change Fund” and US proposal on ‘Global Fund’ proposed contribution from the developing countries under the notion of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. The MEXICAN proposal on the architecture of the Global Climate Change Fund, also termed as green fund, highlighted that the participation in the fund would be voluntary, but that once parties had opted in, their contributions would be based on assessment criteria related to emissions, population and economy. The developing countries also will contribute to the fund but their contributions would be “much smaller but not zero,”. The proposal also noted that the developing country Parties, who will not contribute to the fund, will not have access to the fund. The LDCs would be the only “accepted free-riders;” developing countries would get more than they contribute; and the green fund would not eliminate obligations under other elements of the financial architecture.

Likewise, the US highlighted their proposal for a ‘global fund’ for climate change. The US proposal, that envisaged the continuation of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as an operating entity of the financial mechanism, explained that specific issues, such as priorities and eligibility criteria, would be determined by the COP, and that the fund would be consistent with Convention Article 11 (financial mechanism). The US elaborated that governance arrangements for the new fund would be structured to give a balanced representation of net contributors and net recipients, and indicated that all parties, except the LDCs, would contribute to the fund in line with capabilities but that contributions would not be mandatory.

The G-77/CHINA, BANGLADESH, PAKISTAN, the AFRICAN GROUP, SAUDI ARABIA, CHINA and INDIA expressed reservations with the Mexican proposal. SOUTH AFRICA expressed concern with proposals that would require contribution by developing countries. BANGLADESH also opposed US proposal describing this as a “better packaging” of the proposal by Mexico for a green fund. VENEZUELA said that developed countries were using “green excuses” to get out of their historical responsibilities. The EU emphasized that the “core” of the negotiation is how to mobilize effective financing and that parties need to discuss linkages between sources of funding to create a coherent system.

Again, in relation to the institutional arrangement of finance, CANADA emphasized the need to provide support for adaptation to the poorest and most vulnerable countries, and called for creation of an architecture that maximizes the effectiveness of delivery. JAPAN supported using existing institutional mechanisms. AUSTRALIA introduced their proposal for the post-2012 financial architecture, comprising a facilitative platform operated by the UNFCCC Secretariat, which would link funding to different actions and enable contributors and recipients to navigate new funding arrangements. CANADA highlighted the notion of fostering least-cost approaches by using existing institutions as much as possible, reforming them to the extent necessary and exploring new institutional arrangements where gaps exist.

The G-77/CHINA stressed that existing institutions had failed as a finance delivery system, objected to co-financing and said that the architecture should be concentrated in “one house.” The AFRICAN GROUP underscored that financial mechanisms must be subject to MRV (Measurable Verifiable and Reportable). The LDCs emphasized that existing institutions have failed to provide adequate financing and that a new multi-window institution is needed. This Group stressed that funding should come from public sources in developed countries and be supplemental to official development assistance. Therefore, the use of existing mechanisms was opposed by the Philippines, for the G-77/CHINA, Uganda, for the LDCs, and Egypt, for the AFRICAN GROUP.

Amount of adaptation finance also was a major element of discussion in the Bangkok Climate Talks. There have several studies in place that estimated finance required for adaptation; Oxfam estimated greater than \$50 billion, UNDP \$86 billion and UNFCCC estimates \$28–67 billion per year. INDIA quoted a recent report of the World Bank ‘the Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change’ that estimates US \$75-100 billion per year for adaptation in developing countries. All these figures are very rough estimates, based on certain ‘top-down’ methodologies. To meet the requirement of adaptation finance developing country parties asked for 1-1.5 percent GDP of the developed countries; BANGLADESH put forward this demand several times asking 70 percent of the adaptation to the most vulnerable countries of the LDCs, SIDS and African countries.

The adaptation financing should address different types of adaptation needs, such as: Climate proofing Official Development Assistance (ODA); climate proofing of existing infrastructure; additional investments for new infrastructure; costs on community level /community based adaptation, capacity building; restoration of eco-system services; addressing mass displacement; and; mainstreaming’ adaptation into poverty reduction strategies and other relevant government policies and so on.

Thus, the measures and financing of climate change adaptation should not integrated with the efforts and financing on poverty reduction. In fact, poverty reduction (in the sense of its diverse complex nature) requires financing on social service sectors, creation of local employment opportunity, market promotion, redistribution of resources etc. Although measures of climate change adaptation comply some of the measures of poverty reduction but many of the adaptation measures like restoration of eco-system services, efforts of DRR to address additional risk factors caused by climate change, rehabilitation of the displaced people, technology innovation for agriculture development in the changed climatic condition etc require additional financing. Therefore it’s a challenge how to estimate financial requirement separately for poverty reduction, for DRR, for other adaptation measures and essentially for relief and rehabilitation services.

Innovative funding strategies are needed for climate change adaptation that would encourage collaboration and support local multi-stakeholder partnerships (with representation from high-risk groups) to directly access resources for the implementation of climate risk reduction activities. Ideally such funding mechanisms would serve as an incentive for cross-sectoral linkages and a harmonization of climate adaptation, risk reduction and poverty alleviations activities.

It’s also important to look into the quality of financing and its effectiveness as emphasized in the Paris Declaration. Financing should be sustainable, predictable and with the sense of local ownership. The adaptation financing should be largely and primarily from the public sources of the developed countries not much depending on the ‘market based solution’.

9. CSOs Observation on Bangkok Climate Talks: Fail of Leadership of the Developed Countries

Many of the NGOs/ CSOs I talked expressed their strong concerns over efforts by developed countries to undermine their commitments under the UNFCCC by shifting their responsibilities to the markets and in weakening their obligations at the Bangkok climate talks. They expressed fear that it was not only the Kyoto Protocol that was being “killed”, but also the Convention, which was being buried under a new structure that would no longer be recognizable. They raise the need to respect the right to development in a healthy and ecologically balanced environment.

Many of the Groups pointed out that developed countries owe a ‘climate debt’ to developing countries for their historic excessive overuse of the Earth’s atmospheric space. This over consumption has resulted in an adaptation debt, as developing countries have and are continuing to suffer the worst impacts of climate change; and an emissions debt. Therefore, developed countries must undertake ambitious domestic emission reductions, in order to return the remaining atmospheric space back to developing countries for

their sustainable development needs. Developed countries are committed to provide financing to developing countries for adaptation and mitigation actions. This is not aid, charity, cooperation or support, but a legally binding international obligation.

Approaching the climate change issue as a purely economic one perverts the principle of the "polluter pays", transforming it into "who pays, may pollute"- many CSOs commented.

10. Conclusion

*The desire of the European Union, Japan, Canada and Australia to accommodate the United States and abandon the Kyoto Protocol was an example of the "poor leadership on show by all these countries these past two weeks.....
Oxfam senior climate adviser, Antonio Hill*

In Bangkok, negotiators are trying to hammer out the language of a draft negotiating text to be used in Copenhagen, but this has not happened rather the representatives of the developing countries express worries saying that developed countries are trying to kill the Kyoto Protocol. Instead of focusing discussion on the Protocol's second commitment period, developed country Parties are proposing actions that would lead to a termination of the Kyoto Protocol. Ambassador Lumumba Di-Aping of Sudan, chairman of the G-77 and China Group, said at a press conference, "It has become clear that the intention of developed countries is to kill the Kyoto Protocol." He accused the European countries and the United States of isolationist and exclusionary attitudes.

The KP is the only legal instrument delivering real emission reductions from Annex I Parties. It has proved and is proving to be extremely effective in delivering real emission reductions, at lowest cost to Annex I Parties through flexible mechanisms. All the Parties agreed to the KP where the reduction targets are concretely enumerated and become progressively more ambitious in a step by step wise fashion from one Commitment Period to the next. Therefore, back tracking from KP will raise question about 'responsibility' of the world leaders to the humankind and their 'accountability' to the future generation.

This paper has been written on the basis of UN climate change negotiation on AWG-LCA and AWG-KP that has held in Bangkok from 28 September to 9 October 2009. This analysis focuses the areas of discontents of the country Parties and urges for political decisions and commitment from all country Parties for a responsible deal in Copenhagen in December 2009. This paper does not express the position of any country Party or any Group.

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